By Ruth Binger
Social Media is the new water cooler conversation. It enables and facilitates conversations that years ago would have taken places at the old-fashioned water cooler. In today’s world of Facebook and Twitter, employee complaining is instantly, electronically and permanently transmitted to the world. Social Media users think less about their posts and disclose more so that a simple gripe monologue is turned into dialogue – on steroids – with the world. Such platforms encourage employees to blur their personal and professional lines of behavior and blurt out what is bothering them without engaging their higher level thinking tools.
With seven hundred and fifty million people actively using Facebook, there is a significant chance that a post about working conditions, compensation or other issues related to their employment will spark a conversation with an employee’s colleagues, and such conversations may constitute concerted activity under the National Labor Relations Act.
The question remains, if your employees say something negative on Facebook about your company, their fellow employees or their supervisors, can you terminate without running afoul of the National Labor Relations Act?
The answer depends on the facts surrounding the post(s). The test is whether the employee is engaging in activity solely for himself or on behalf of other employees.
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08/30/11 8:40 AM
Business Law, Case Studies, Intellectual Property | Comments Off on Employee Social Media Griping: Can An Employer Terminate Employees Because of Their Social Media Posts Without Violating Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act |
Employee Social Media Griping: Can An Employer Terminate Employees Because of Their Social Media Posts Without Violating Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
By Joseph R. Soraghan
The Basic Requirements: Early History
Any sale of a security to a Missouri resident must either be registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Missouri Securities Commission, or have at least one specific provable exemption from each of those two requirements.
In 1953, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the “private offering” exemption of §4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) required that the issuer prove that all “offerees” (not only purchasers) had sufficient investment sophistication and financial well-being (hereinafter “investment suitability”) to establish that they did not “need the protection of registration” under the 1933 Act. SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119 (1953) But because of the illusory definition of “offerees” as including possibly every person who learned of an offering (not just those receiving an “offer” in the contract sense), the availability and thus the usefulness of the private offering exemption of Section 4(2), was thereafter seriously curtailed.
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12/1/07 5:21 PM
Business Law, Case Studies, Securities Law | Comments Off on Holy Moses, Batman! They’ve Stolen Our Private Placement Exemptions! |
Holy Moses, Batman! They’ve Stolen Our Private Placement Exemptions!